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The dismal trail of hostility, fear, violence, and social
upheaval aroused by ethnic, religious, racial, and other diversities
is a very long one. The trail leads from today's Sri Lanka,
Rwanda, the Balkans, the Mideast, and many other dangerous
neighborhoods back to the earliest human communities at the
dawn of recorded history. Countless blood-soaked battle
monuments and endless graveyards mark the path. In this
otherwise dark history, of course, one can also find instances of
what we now view as humane enlightenment. Moreover, because
historians' attention, like ours, is naturally drawn more to the
drama of militant conflict than to the dullness of amiable concord,
such instances are probably more common than we who have lived
in the most murderous of all centuries can imagine.
Many different peoples, cultures, and religious groups have
dwelt peaceably near one another time out of mind, each
absorbing and at the same time transforming aspects of the other's
culture. Indeed, the most dynamic and durable civilizations in the
modern world, including the United States, are mongrel cultures
that borrow from, hybridize, and transform those of other
societies. In most cases, successful cultural syncretism of this kind
has followed in the wake of commercial relationships, which often
flourish at the points where ethnic enclaves converge. In this
sense, traders are the vanguard of a civilization; they penetrate the
unknown culture, perform valuable reconnaissance there, excite
curiosities and demands in both societies, and act as middlemen in
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many different ways. In the short run, this engagement may
engender intercultural conflict; in the long run, however,
commerce tends to foster an appreciation of interdependence and
a desire for material gain through exchange. These values
encourage peaceful relations, a live-and-let-live tolerance, a
longer-term perspective, and a respect for (the profitability of)
differences.
But even after due recognition of these many instances of
mutual gains from economic and cultural trade, toleration of
differences, and social cross-fertilization, the fact remains that
history provides few if any examples of societies that value
diversity as a positive ideal to be celebrated and actively and
collectively pursued, rather than as a potentially dangerous
condition that threatens social turmoil and hence must be carefully
controlled. Indeed, the principle that seems to have guided most
societies in all other eras time out of mind is that diversity means
serious trouble and that (trading relations aside) diversity must be
assiduously managed, much as one would manage a wild animal in
captivity. If necessary, it should be violently repressed; if possible,
eliminated. To this nearly universal pattern, contemporary
America is the great exception.
To rigorously substantiate this claim about traditional hostility
toward diversity would be an impossible task considering the vast
number of societies today (the United Nations now has twice as
many members as it did in 1945), the many millennia in which
communal life has existed (paleontology keeps pushing back in
time the dawn of the earliest human societies), and the elusiveness
of reliable evidence about values and behavior during most of this
period. In order to render the task manageable, I must limit
myself to the briefest sketch of how diversity has been viewed in
the dominant Western tradition going back to biblical times. A
more substantive limitation confines the scope of this survey to
views about diversity as a discrete abstract good or goal (what I am
calling diversity-as-ideal). Needless to say, I do not review the
countless conflicts through the ages over the treatment of groups
that power holders thought of as problematically different (in my
terms, diversity-as-fact). I mention these specific conflicts only
when, as in the case of the religious wars of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, they prompted more abstract speculation
about the nature and value of diversity-as-ideal.
These examples, however, are remarkably few. Until
publication of Charles Darwin's theories of biological speciation
and competition and John Stuart Mill's broad vindication of
religious and political liberty in the mid-nineteenth century, one
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finds little discussion of diversity-as-ideal. With a few visionary
exceptions, it is not until the 1960s, and then largely in the United
States, that one finds ethnic and cultural diversity widely hailed as
a good in itself that society should try to actively promote rather
than a social evil that should be feared as a dangerous, divisive
condition that expedient nation builders must somehow
domesticate and bridle. Part I of this Article briefly reviews the
historical evidence.
Even today, this affirmative embrace by large segments of
society of the most politically controversial forms of diversity-
ethnic, religious, cultural, and even economic-remains largely a
North American phenomenon. As a way to understand the variety
of normative stances that one might take toward diversity, Part II
of this Article considers how people who subscribe to a number of
different social-political theories would value it.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IDEAL OF DIVERSITY
The ancient world evidently did not value diversity-as-ideal.
For aught that appears, this notion was either not considered or, as
in the case of Platonic philosophy, was regarded as a metaphysical
absurdity and a moral abomination. Although theologians and
Old Testament scholars disagree about precisely what Israel's
"chosenness" meant to God and to the Israelites,1 it entailed, at
the very least, a vast and complex ensemble of distinctive
religioethnic beliefs and practices. More to the point, the God of
the Old Testament ordained that this comprehensive body of
Jewish belief and practice would be, and forever remain, unique.
Jews' singular role in history was revealed as a matter of
responsibility, not of pride, and this special responsibility, God
charged, must never yield to the repressions (and worse) that
awaited them. The fact that the Scriptures imposed no duty to
seek converts to the Jewish way of life hardly bespoke any notion
of diversity-as-ideal. Quite the contrary, the Old Testament
contains many dramatic instances of divine intolerance for, and
indeed destruction of, other peoples committed to different values.
And for every Noah parable about the rich fecundity and diversity
of God's creations, there is a Tower of Babel story about the
incoherence, even unintelligibility, of human creatures to one
another.2 The prophetic telos of the Messianic era, to be sure,
I For modern discussions of "chosenness," see, for example, K. KOHLER, JEWISH
THEOLOGY, SYSTEMATICALLY AND HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED (1918); W. GUNTHER
PLAUT, THE CASE FOR THE CHOSEN PEOPLE (1965); H.H. ROWLEY, THE BIBLICAL
DOCTRINE OF ELECTION (1950).
2 See Genesis 11:1-9.
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would culminate in universal peace and harmony, but this
transcendent vision-like countless utopian visions ever since-
sought an eradication of conflict and difference, not an embrace of
diversity-as-ideal.
The world of the New Testament is, if anything, even less
celebratory of diversity-as-ideal. Jesus, of course, is the reification
of tolerance, extending divine grace to criminals, prostitutes,
doubters, nonbelievers, traitors, persecutors, and the dispossessed
alike. But the Gospels also enjoin Jesus' followers to proselytize
by spreading the Word, converting the unenlightened, and
inducting them into the universal Church. Although Jesus and his
disciples were subjected to violent persecutions, the Church that
the Roman emperor Constantine established after his conversion
in 325 A.D. initiated a tradition and justification of persecuting
heterodox Christians and others that continued, with the
enthusiastic and often violent assistance of its secular allies, well
into the modern era.
Both the Greek and Roman cultures were highly chauvinistic
and often xenophobic despite, or perhaps because of, the
multiplicity of cultures over which they presided at the height of
their imperial power. Both exalted their own accomplishments as
evidence of a cultural and moral superiority to the "barbarians"
(as they came to be called) that justified a cultural hegemony in
addition to their political, military, and economic domination. In
neither case, however, was this classical sense of superiority to the
barbarians conceived of in racial terms. ,[E]ven at the most
arrogant period of their ascendancy," one historian observes, "the
criterion of color had little place in their system."' 3 It coexisted,
moreover, with a respect for certain aspects of some of the foreign
cultures with which Greece and Rome frequently came into
contact, some of which they ruled, and from which they often
borrowed much.
Indeed, the ancients' apparent lack of widespread race- or
color-consciousness, much less of a theory of inherent biological
superiority, is most striking to the modern reader who is all too
familiar with the recent history of racism and who imagines that
this history is a linearly progressive one. Like much else in ancient
history, the precise relationship between Greeks and Romans, on
the one hand, and black Africans, on the other, remains unclear to
classical historians. But many of them agree that the ancients
probably did not harbor racial prejudice, at least as we understand
that term. Greeks and Romans did not treat Ethiopians, the most
3 HENRY VAN HIEN SEKYI, COLOUR PREJUDICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 22
(1994).
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prominent Blacks in the ancient world, conspicuously differently
from other subject peoples. Indeed, one historian shows that
Greeks like the poet Homer and the historian Herodotus and
Romans like the historians Diodorus, Pliny, and Lucian even
praised the Ethiopians, hailing their religiosity, wisdom, personal
beauty, virtue, and intelligence. Ancient slavery, moreover, was
not tied to race-most slaves were enslaved as war booty-so
Blacks were not stigmatized as particularly or inherently slavish.
It is harder, of course, to know how the anonymous mass of
common people viewed such differences. Classicist Paul
Cartledge, for example, emphasizes the changes in Greek thought
that came in the wake of the Persian War in the fifth century B.C.,
when the term "barbarian" came into widespread use, Aristotle
wrote and taught of the natural servility of barbarians, restrictions
on the political rights of foreigners were imposed, and politicians
encouraged xenophobia in their followers.
The ostensible absence of race prejudice, the acceptance of
miscegenation and raciallly mixed marriages, and the evident
respect for aspects of foreign cultures, at least among the articulate
elites, do not necessarily signify that a notion of diversity-as-ideal
existed in the ancient world. In fact, classicists like Edith Hall who
study the rich cross-fertilization between Greece and other
civilizations, especially in the Hellenistic era, do not suggest that
the Greeks idealized the notion of difference in this way, much less
that they celebrated it for its own sake. Rather, they underscore
the Greeks' profound ethnocentrism, exemplified in the
characterizations in high Greek tragedies as well as in many other
cultural forms.' Even a classicist like Arnaldo Momigliano, who
emphasizes the Hellenists' remarkable openness to foreign ideas,
particularly in the religious realm, does not claim that this denoted
a respect for diversity-as-ideal. Still less does he suggest that they
exhibited a desire for more ethnic diversity.'
The best evidence of European attitudes toward diversity-as-
ideal before their discovery of the New World and their
exploration of Africa lies in the realm of Jewish ethnicity, not skin
color. In the medieval period, as one historian puts it, "color is
still, as in the ancient world, the effect of environment, not a
matter for reproach."7 Anti-Semitism on the part of the Church
4 See PAUL CARTLEDGE, THE GREEKS: A PORTRAIT OF SELF AND OTHERS 43-49
(1993).
5 See EDITH HALL, INVENTING THE BARBARIAN: GREEK SELF-DEFINITION
THROUGH TRAGEDY (1989).
6 See ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO, ALIEN WISDOM: THE LIMITS OF HELLENIZATION
(1975).
7 SEKYI, supra note 3, at 8-9.
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and European sovereigns, however, can be traced at least back to
some commercial and religious developments in the eleventh
century. The expansion of production and markets brought
previously dominant Jewish merchants into direct competition
with Christian ones, who squeezed Jews out of commerce, forced
them into the much despised business of money lending, and
aroused widespread hostility on the part of their borrowers. The
consolidation of religious power in Rome coincided with increased
popular and elite antagonism and violence toward Jews, leading to
their exclusion from, and ghettoization in, many communities.
Many massacres of European Jews were perpetrated during the
Crusades, and the political and economic power held by feudal
lords left the fate of Jewish communities in their hands.
This was also a period in which Christian scholars published
"disputations," dialogues in which Christian protagonists forcefully
disparaged the Jewish tradition, as well as other kinds of
denunciations of Jews as a group During the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, a growing centralization of power in the
embryonic states of Europe-centralization that had favored Jews
in the time of Charlemagne and the early Holy Roman Empire-
worked to their great detriment as Jews were subjected to
arbitrary arrests, demands for enormous ransoms, expulsions,
expropriations, violence, isolation, and other forms of persecution.
Islam, which came to dominate much of the world from Spain
to parts of south Asia during the Middle Ages, was usually more
tolerant of Jews; Muslims consider Jews, along with Muslims and
Christians, to be "people of the Book." Under the seventh-
century Pact of Umar, Jews were permitted to live in relative
peace under Muslim rule. Historians find little evidence that
Muslims harbored much color prejudice. They esteemed Sudanese
Blacks highly, enslaved only those, black or otherwise, who would
not submit to Islam, and viewed negritude as a product of
environment, not a sign of inferiority. "[T]he Arab," a student of
color prejudice writes, "was no less ethnocentric than any other,
but his ethnocentrism was as color-blind as that of the ancient
Greek or Roman, just like his version of slavery."9
The immense carnage, social upheavals, and political
repressions caused by the religious wars of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries prompted some fundamental rethinking of
the nature and treatment of political and religious diversity in
society. The Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and intra-
8 LEONARD B. GLICK, ABRAHAM'S HEIRS: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS IN MEDIEVAL
EUROPE 140-42 (1999).
9 SEKYI, supra note 3, at 38.
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Protestant sectarian persecutions unleashed violent and costly
struggles throughout Europe. Campaigns of forced conversion
and suppression of dissent conducted by states and their
established churches produced much death, destruction, and
eventually out-migration to the New World, but these campaigns
seldom succeeded in eliminating heterodoxy; sometimes, they even
strengthened it. These incendiary conditions vastly increased the
stakes in enabling diverse groups with disparate beliefs to reach
modus vivendi. Achieving some level of toleration became
imperative.
Among the first to articulate the need for at least a limited
degree of toleration was John Milton. In his famous
Areopagitica,° published in 1644, he made what may be the first
extended justification in writing of the need to tolerate religious
and political diversity. Like most of those who would defend
toleration thereafter, Milton did not argue for it on the ground,
which was wholly alien to his time, that diversity, like wealth,
beauty, or happiness, was a social good in and of itself and one that
we should seek to enhance or multiply. For him, toleration was
rather an instrumental practice. Its value was that it would
increase the acceptance of the true religion. "The knowledge and
survey of vice," he wrote, "is in this world so necessary to the
constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the
confirmation of truth."11 Censorship, which was Areopagitica's
immediate target, would impede potential believers in their
journey toward the revealed truth. The closest that Milton came
to the notion of diversity-as-ideal was his belief that censorship
would impoverish the human spirit and society's capacity for moral
growth."
A half-century later, Milton's countryman John Locke also
published a famous defense of religious dissenters, but one limited
to those within the larger Christian community of faith. In his
Letter on Toleration, Locke argued that authentic religious
identification and belief, not the outward forms of worship, was
essential to genuine Christian morality. "A man cannot be forced
to be saved," Locke wrote. 3 "In the end he must be left to himself
and his own conscience. '"4 It followed, then, that "[t]he toleration
of those who hold different opinions on matters of religion is so
10 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION (K.M. Lea ed., 1973) (1644).
11 Id. at 15.
12 See id. at 37.
13 JOHN LOCKE, EPISTOLA DE TOLERANTIA: A LETTER ON TOLERATION 101
(Raymond Klibansky ed., J.W. Gough trans., Clarendon Press 1968) (1689)
14 Id. at 101.
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agreeable to the Gospel and to reason."15 For our purposes, what
is most interesting about Locke's position is how narrow and
instrumental his ideal of acceptable diversity was. It applied only
to religious diversity and indeed only to diversity within a single
religion, and he justified it not as good in itself but rather as a
necessary concession to the recalcitrant spirit. This is a far cry
from an endorsement of diversity as an affirmative value.
In order to find some more substantial glimmerings of the
idea of diversity-as-ideal, we must look not to the British
philosophical tradition-at least until John Stuart Mill in the mid-
nineteenth century-but to the Continent, especially France.
There, discussions of diversity proceeded from a number of
different perspectives, almost all of them engaging with issues of
diversity-as-fact and considering diversity quite narrowly and, by
modern standards, intolerantly. 6 Many French theorists, for
example, took an explicitly ethnocentric view of diversity in
matters of religion and culture. Blaise Pascal is typical of those
who in solipsistic fashion ascribed universal validity to his own
Christian and nationalistic (i.e., French) values. Others, like
Joseph-Marie de Gerando and Jean de La Bruy~re, did not so
much reject universalism as criticize the crude stereotyping of
other groups that underlay such thinking. Jean-Jacques Rousseau
went even further in rejecting ethnocentrism while clinging to the
notion of values and proclivities that transcend contingent features
of identity: "[A]fter noting the differences," he explained, "one
must return to the universal idea of man."'7 Rousseau, then, offers
a universalist justification for tolerance, not for diversity-as-ideal.
Other French thinkers discussed diversity more explicitly, but
in baldly hegemonic terms. Gustave Le Bon, for example,
acknowledged the substantial differences among cultures, races,
sexes, and classes but clearly distinguished between what he
viewed as superior and inferior ones, condemning French
colonialism because it promoted assimilation of degraded
populations. In the same way, Georges-Louis Buffon, and later
Joseph-Artur Gobineau, while arguing that humans were naturally
similar, maintained that their subsequent development created
markedly superior and inferior groups and civilizations.
Some thinkers, however, viewed diversity more favorably, and
a few of them came close to articulating, and even advocating, a
15 Id. at 65.
16 This paragraph and the three that follow borrow heavily from Tzvetan Todorov. See
TzVETAN TODOROV, ON HUMAN DIVERSITY: NATIONALISM, RACISM, AND EXOTICISM
IN FRENCH THOUGHT (Catherine Porter trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (1989).
17 Id. at 10-11.
1922 [Vol. 22:1915
HeinOnline -- 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1922 2000-2001
PERCEIVED VALUES OFDIVERSITY
notion similar to diversity-as-ideal. One group, exemplified by
Victor Segalen, embraced diversity for its exoticism and esthetic
possibilities. To these exoticists, diversity was valuable because it
arouses new sensations and experiences in the cultural novice,
delighting him with its uniqueness and authenticity. Another
group, represented first by Montaigne and Montesquieu and later
by Alexis de Tocqueville and, in Britain, John Stuart Mill, viewed
diversity as a spur to the learning, knowledge, and adaptation
essential to the progress of any civilization.
Montaigne advanced a then-radical form of relativism and
toleration, endorsing religious pluralism and indeed diversity in all
things while rejecting the idea that some moral or political systems
are more natural, and hence better, than others. "I know of no
better school.., for forming one's life," he wrote, "than to set
before it constantly the diversity of so many other lives, ideas, and
customs, and to make it taste such a perpetual variety of forms of
nature."18 Montesquieu, for his part, not only thought diversity
was socially useful-as close to a conception and valuation of
diversity-as-ideal as one can find until much later in the United
States-but also maintained that it could be the subject of
systematic study, a conviction that he demonstrated in his 1748
masterpiece, The Spirit of the Laws. 9
Tocqueville, a more ethnocentric and even chauvinistic figure
than Montaigne or Montesquieu, nevertheless admired the social
role of diversity, especially political and class diversity, in
advancing liberty and averting the tyranny of majorities.
Astonished and stimulated by the profuse social diversity that he
observed in Jacksonian America, Tocqueville feared that the
absence of an aristocratic class in America that was committed to
distinctive, honor-driven values, coupled with the society's
egalitarianism, the force of mass opinion, and the legacy of slavery,
would undermine the project of democratic self-government and
ultimately liberal freedom itself. His admiration for the diversity
he observed in America was thus decidedly mixed.
America's founding generation endorsed a level of religious
and political toleration that was remarkable for its time, even
recognizing the important but ephemeral exception of the Alien
and Sedition Acts. But their most articulate expositors betrayed
no commitment to any transcendant ideal of diversity-as-ideal.
Much like Locke, who influenced him greatly, Thomas Jefferson
favored a mild, tolerant, and rationalistic brand of religion that
18 TODOROV, supra note 16, at 37-38 (quoting Montaigne, Of Vanity, 111.9).
19 CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
(Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1949) (1748).
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historians call Deism. He also went beyond Locke by abandoning
all doctrines at odds with his scientific convictions, denying the
authority of Christ and scripture, extending toleration to all
religious dissenters, including Catholics and atheists, and opposing
all government financial support for religion as tyrannical and an
establishment by the federal government. But these views should
not be mistaken for an affirmative endorsement of religious
diversity. Quite the contrary, Jefferson was contemptuous of
many Christian doctrines and sects and viewed Jewish theology as
"degrading and injurious."2 His disdain for racial diversity is even
clearer notwithstanding his famously inconsistent avowals
concerning the slavery question. Jefferson insisted that Blacks
were vastly inferior and that Indians, for whose culture and
institutions he had greater respect, would best assimilate with
Whites. He would have viewed any notion that racial diversity as
such was a social good as both absurd and vicious.
Unlike his mentor Jefferson, James Madison was a devout
Christian who deeply respected others' religious convictions and
practices and viewed religious conviction as a social and political
virtue. Like Jefferson, Madison believed strongly in protecting
freedom of conscience and worship but never got beyond the
principle of religious toleration to embrace any ideal of religious
diversity as such. In contrast, Madison was more consistently and
publicly antislavery than Jefferson was, though historians disagree
about just how thoroughgoing his opposition was. But Madison
wrote nothing suggesting any belief in the social value of racial
diversity as such. (He did, however, have more complicated views
about the role of diverse interests in political life, views that I
discuss below.)
In truth, America's embrace of diversity-as-ideal, as a
proclaimed social goal, is a quite recent infatuation. Until the
1960s, the history of American race relations was stained by almost
unremitting hostility to and discrimination against Blacks, Browns,
Native-Americans, and those immigrants (including many that the
then-conventional racial wisdom counted as Caucasians, albeit
inferior types) who did not conform to the dominant
British/northern European archetype. By no means confined to
the southern states, racist currents ran deep in many northern
communities as well. This was demonstrated by the many
restrictions on the liberties of even free Blacks well into the
twentieth century and by the persistent violence against them.
The persecution of religious minorities, like that of racial
20 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1450 (1990).
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minorities, was also widespread from the earliest settlements in
colonial America well into the middle of the twentieth century.
This intolerance extended far beyond the harsh treatment of Jews
and other non-Christians; targets also included Catholics and to a
much lesser extent some evangelical Protestants. Indeed, before
the Revolutionary War, every colony enacted anti-Catholic laws
restricting certain religious practices, public and private activities,
and some other rights attached to common citizenship. Most of
the American states established tax-supported churches; the last of
these was disestablished only in the 1830s. As recently as 1960,
John F. Kennedy's Catholicism was a much discussed issue in his
presidential campaign, though not a decisive one in the end.
Political dissenters were firmly suppressed even more than
religious minorities were. Concerns about "fifth column" treason
(a thread of both anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism) led certain
colonies to expel some minority groups. The Alien and Sedition
Acts in the late 1790s, unconstitutional by today's standards, were
enacted to stifle the emerging Jeffersonian movement. Laws were
targeted at various radical movements in the antebellum years,
and labor activists (many of them immigrants and thus easy
targets) were violently attacked in the postbellum period.
Suspected radicals were prosecuted during and after both world
wars, as were civil rights workers well into the 1960s. Only in 1964
were strong legal remedies for unequal treatment of racial and
religious minorities adopted at the federal level; discrimination
against the disabled in federally supported programs was banned
only in 1991. Even today, few jurisdictions have enacted laws
protecting homosexuals against bias.
From colonial times, of course, countless visitors and
observers commented on America's unusual demography, and
many of them went on to praise it in rhetoric, humor, story, song,
and other cultural forms. Walt Whitman was perhaps the most
lyrical of these ardent celebrants of diversity. Like the French
visitor Crevecoeur almost a century earlier, Ralph Waldo Emerson
wrote admiringly of a new amalgamated, vigorous race of
Americans, and Herman Melville depicted the United States as a
universal nation almost a century and a half before demographer
Ben Wattenberg did.21
Whitman's poetry depicted diversity, somewhat paradoxically,
as an encompassing, universal bond among men and women,
21 See DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTEHTNIC AMERICA: BEYOND
MULTICULTURALISM 87-89 (1995); BEN WAqTENBERG, THE FIRST UNIVERSAL NATION:
LEADING INDICATORS AND IDEAS ABOUT THE SURGE OF AMERICA IN THE 1990S
(1991).
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arising from an encounter between their irreducible uniqueness
and differences and their natural human sympathy based on a
transcendent commonality.22  Several decades later, cultural
pluralist writers also romanticized American diversity, elevating it
to the level of national myth and inspiring a generation of liberals
who were searching for a new modernist, nonracist political
identity.
Friends of the diversity ideal, however, were decidedly the
exceptions. From colonial times until the post-World War II era,
American attitudes toward non-Protestant, non-English-speaking
immigrants, Blacks, and Native-Americans were dominated by
rabid intolerance, recurrent violence, and insistent demands either
for cultural extermination, isolation, or assimilation. Indeed,
through almost all of this period, even the white, Christian,
English-speaking Irish immigrants suffered pervasive
discrimination of a kind almost unimaginable (and almost certainly
illegal) today. Only with the enormous flood of immigrants during
the four decades between the 1880s and the 1920s, most of whom
came from relatively impoverished areas of southern and eastern
Europe, did ethnic diversity-as a socially desirable condition, not
just a demographic fact-become the subject of sustained debate
among American public intellectuals.
More important for our purposes, even diversity's friends
defined its scope and character quite differently than many of us
do today. Whitman, for example, evidently favored social
diversity only by excluding non-Whites from its scope. David
Hollinger notes that some later cultural pluralists like Randolph
Bourne and Horace Kallen "considered themselves radical for
appreciating the cultural contributions of Jews, Irish Catholics, and
various Slavic and Mediterranean peoples, yet were slow to
conceive of the possibility that pluralism might provide legitimacy
to peoples known today as African American, Asian American,
indigenous, and Latino. ' '23 The diversity they valued extended
beyond the white race-which, as we have seen, was then more
narrowly defined than it is today-but they conceived of it almost
entirely as a matter of autonomous group activity undertaken in a
private sphere and little affected by a laissez-faire state whose
main role, insofar as group life was concerned, was to avoid
impinging on that autonomy. Indeed, they wrote during and after
World War I, when governments-abetted by nativist,
xenophobic, and reactionary sentiments in the public-were busily
22 For examples of Whitman's lyricism about diversity, see Anthony T. Kronman, Is
Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 311, 327-33 (1999).
23 HOLLINGER, supra note 21, at 90.
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harassing, persecuting, and prosecuting groups (some of them
ethnically identified) suspected of disloyalty, especially German
immigrants like Kallen. Not surprisingly, they regarded state
intrusion into group life as a threat to diversity. The state's
legitimate role, in their view, was to secure democratic citizens, not
to influence group life. Not anticipating the creation of the New
Deal administrative state a decade or more later, they never
entertained the possibility that group diversity would become an
affirmative government policy in which law would play regulatory,
prescriptive, and promotional roles. Had they done so, they
probably would have recoiled; recent history justified their fear
that state intervention was a mortal threat to their project of
preserving authentic group differences.
If the Whitmanesque idealization of diversity was monoracial,
and if the cultural pluralists feared any affirmative role for the
state, the assimilation vision sought to dissolve diversity.
Assimilationists, who have always dominated public attitudes
toward newcomers to the United States, favor minimizing or
eliminating many salient group differences in pursuit of a more or
less homogenous national culture and political identity.
Assimilationists disagree only about which methods should be
employed and how long the moulting of foreign ways should take.
Some of the more extreme ones-Henry Ford was a notorious
example-were avowedly racist, anti-Semitic, and nativist. They
demanded that immigrants efface their ethnic identities and
submit to the dominant, unquestionably superior culture. Their
goal was to produce the kind of "100% Americans" that Milton
Gordon, a leading assimilation theorist, called "Anglo-
conformity."24 Assimilationism did devise some genuinely useful
integrative and educational innovations, especially English
language instruction, but many of its true believers were
unabashedly intolerant and, by today's standards, offensively
intrusive as they sought to eradicate the old cultures with swift and
sometimes brutal efficiency.
A much more tolerant form of assimilationism derived from
what Gordon called the "melting pot" ideal, referring to Israel
Zangwill's eponymous play staged at the height of the mass
European migration to the United States. This conception of
Americanism, in versions like Zangwill's, paid more respect to the
diverse cultures being brought across the Atlantic. They predicted
that these unfamiliar ways of life would not only transform the
dominant one but also enrich it. Epitomized by the foxhole films
24 MILTON M. GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE,
RELIGION, AND NATIONAL ORIGIN 88-114 (1964).
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and propaganda of World War II featuring soldiers and civilians
from different ethnic groups sacrificing for the nation, the melting
pot assimilationists expected the newcomers to shed their old-
world attachments and habits in favor of a uniquely American
blend. This blend would constantly change as it absorbed and
dissolved new groups over time, yielding a fresh and hopefully
superior amalgam.
But lest we criticize the melting pot vision too harshly,
Michael Lind reminds us that "the then-new and progressive ideal
of melting-pot nationalism.., was centrist or liberal in a time
when the right was still strongly racist and nativist."2 Most
cultural pluralists, like most of today's multiculturalists, were
attacking the melting pot from the left and emphasizing toleration,
inclusiveness, and resistance to Anglo-conformity. Hollinger notes
some important differences within these reformist ranks. He
shows, for example, that the more cosmopolitan Bourne feared
that Kallen's pluralism might fall prey to its more ethnocentric
tendencies and harden intergroup boundaries. John Dewey, Jane
Addams, Louis Brandeis, Louis Adamic, and other liberals who
shared Kallen's respect for diversity debated this issue as well.26
This darker, more parochial, ethnocentric side of cultural
pluralism has continued to haunt American liberalism. As
Hollinger suggests, this is probably why the leading pluralist work
of the 1950s, Will Herberg's Protestant, Catholic, Jew,27 confined its
argument to the religious domain, disdaining the dangerous
romanticism of Kallen's approach, and why the early civil rights
movement emphasized black integration and the permeability of
group cultural boundaries.
Several developments during the late 1960s and early 1970s,
however, radicalized ethnic group politics. In the wake of the
urban riots and the Nixon administration's accession to power,
black separatism gained greater influence over the civil rights
movement. The Vietnam War alienated many middle-class and
elite Americans from a broad range of national institutions.
Impatience with group inequalities grew even as those inequalities
diminished. The Democratic Party changed its rules to increase
the role of minority factions and women. The result of all this was
a dominant multiculturalist sensibility that left the old politically
conservative, European-centered, patriotic cultural pluralism far
25 MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM AND
THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 237 (1995).
26 See HOLLINGER, supra note 21, at 93-95.
27 WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (1955).
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behind, as their differences obscured their commonalities.
Cultural pluralism had been a minor movement in the history of
the American academic and literary intelligentsia. By contrast,
multiculturalism has proved to be a major preoccupation in
American life as registered in the deliberations of local school
boards and in the professional journals of the humanities and
social sciences.
The triumph of basic multicultualism has fostered a
sensitivity to diversity so acute that the deep differences
between the various groups and subgroups are now being
addressed with unprecedented ethnographic detail and
theoretical sophistication .... The more these differences have
come to be recognized, the more difficult it has become to
convincingly represent American society in classically pluralist
fashion as an expanse of internally homogenenous and
analogically structured units, each authorized by an ancestral
charter and each possessed of a singular mythology of diaspora.
The heightened sensitivity to diversity fostered by
multiculturalism has had the ironic result of diversifying
diversity to the point that the ethno-racial pentagon can no
longer contain it.28
Given this long procession of fears about the damage that a
robust diversity might unleash on American society, fears that
persist today, why have so many Americans come to believe
instead that diversity is no longer a worrisome demographic fact
that must somehow be cabined but rather is a vital end in itself
that public and private institutions should actively foster? What
can explain the widespread currency of this unprecedented, if not
ahistorical, view? Knowing the immense social turmoil and
suffering throughout history wreaked by diversity and especially
by diversity's enemies, why don't more Americans view it as a
menace to be confined, suppressed, and perhaps eliminated-just
as almost all other societies have done and as the vast majority still
do?
One possible answer is that many Americans do indeed
oppose diversity-that the 1965 reform of the immigration law did
not mark the end of nativism, and the surge of newcomers since
then has aroused latent fears about diversity. There is much truth
to this answer. A recent study of nativism in the United States,
France, and Germany finds that it survives in all of them, though it
ebbs and flows. It is also true that most Americans continue to
favor lower levels of immigration. Still, no one can doubt that the
United States is far more receptive to diverse immigration than
28 Id. at 101-02.
2001] 1929
HeinOnline -- 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1929 2000-2001
CARDOZO LAWREVIEW
any other country; only Canada comes close. Nor is immigration
the only domain of diversity in which American attitudes are
distinctive. For example, American environmentalism differs from
its foreign counterparts in a number of respects, including its
emphasis on the use of law and litigation to protect species and
habitat diversity, much as the American civil rights movement
used it to promote racial diversity.
Another response to this question about American
exceptionalism is to deny the premise that we know history's grim
record of diversity-related violence. After all, we are often said to
be an ahistorical, even antihistorical people, eager to efface our
pasts, invent ourselves anew, and conquer the future. Perhaps we
are a people so blessed that we can afford to disregard Santayana's
dictum and ignore many of the harsh lessons that history has
taught other peoples. So intoxicated by our sense of unique
destiny, perhaps we assume that any such lessons simply do not
apply to us. Americans, however, are no more ignorant of the past
than other people; indeed, the nation's ever-higher educational
level suggests more exposure to these teachings, not less.
Moreover, newspaper headlines and TV reports about the use of
American troops for international peacekeeping, humanitarian,
military, and nation-building purposes have made us all too
familiar with the risks of communal violence in societies that use
force in order to extrude troublesome minorities from their midst.
The question thus remains: why have Americans come to
believe that the terrible communal violence associated with
diversity throughout the world and throughout time will not
happen here? We might begin with the natural human propensity
to make a virtue of necessity-demographic necessity, in this
case-to accept what cannot be changed and make the best of it.
Ethnic and other diversities, greatly extended through the post-
1965 migrations to the United States, are already so pervasive and
entrenched today that the real question for pragmatic Americans
is not whether they would have favored these diversities at their
inception; rather, it is how best to live with them now that they are
in place and seem irreversible. This attitude helps explain public
sentiments toward immigrants and immigration that might
otherwise seem inconsistent. Most Americans tend to admire the
immigrants they know and believe that immigration-related
diversity has been good for the country, but they also wish there
were less of it-and they have always felt this way. A leading
student of public views on immigration put it this way: "We view
1930 [Vol. 22:1915
HeinOnline -- 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1930 2000-2001
PERCEIVED VALUES OFDIVERS1TY
immigrants with rose-colored glasses turned backwards. 29
By itself, this explanation is unsatisfying. It begins with the
post-1965 diversity regime when what needs explaining is why this
regime has proved so durable and has become a policy platform
for the promotion of further diversity. Moreover, much of the
support for diversity is genuinely enthusiastic, not just a grudging
surrender to demography. There are other and better
explanations for Americans' exceptional commitment to diversity.
Indeed, there are too many of them for us to be certain about their
relative causal significance.
All polities, including our own, possess immense social
resources for repressing and sublimating ugly and shameful
memories. But a striking feature of modern life, especially once a
growing understanding of the Holocaust had spawned a truly
international and militant human rights movement, is that such
denials and concealments have become more difficult to maintain.
Under these novel conditions, one should not underestimate the
power of an aroused and mobilized public morality to shape a
collective sense of guilt and injustice strong enough to influence
national attitudes and policies. This reformist zeal has been a
striking feature of American society from its colonial beginnings,
especially during and after the recurrent periods of intense
religious revivalism known as "great awakenings." We are now in
another such period, which Robert Fogel calls "the Fourth Great
Awakening."30
Today, many Americans, especially but not exclusively on the
political left, want to use immigration and other preferential
policies as a way of acknowledging and rectifying past wrongs
perpetrated by the United States and its allies: the expropriation of
Native-Americans; the abominations of slavery and segregation;
the internment of Americans of Japanese descent during World
War II; a punishing and misguided Vietnam War; support of
tyrannical regimes in the Caribbean, Philippines, Central America,
and elsewhere before and during the Cold War; historic
discrimination against ethnic minorities and women; and, most
recently, apparent atrocities during the Korean War. Animated in
large part by feelings of guilt and a desire for reconciliation and
rectification, the U.S. government has in all of these cases adopted
29 PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 9 (quoting Rita J. Simon, Immigration and Public
Opinion, Paper Presentation Before the National Legal Conference on Immigration and
Refugee Policy (Mar. 30, 1995)).
30 See ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, THE FOURTH GREAT AWAKENING & THE FUTURE
OF EGALITARIANISM (2000).
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remedial policies. Some of these policies-for example,
immigration preferences for our Vietnam War allies and
Amerasian children, Affirmative Action programs, and civil rights
laws-have been designed to promote diversity.
Support for a diverse immigration policy, of course, is
motivated by much more than guilt. Traditional interest-group
politics explains much of it. Agricultural growers and many other
businesses have long advocated expanded immigration from
countries that can supply needed workers. Even some groups that
have traditionally opposed immigration now support it. Blacks,
for example, are eager to cement political coalitions with Latino
groups seeking more immigration from Central and South
America, while organized labor now views immigrants as potential
members and even favors both a broad amnesty for many
undocumented workers and the repeal of the law imposing
sanctions on those who employ them. Much support, moreover,
also comes from relatively advantaged Americans who enjoy the
economic and other benefits of immigration, including diversity
values, without themselves having to compete with immigrants for
housing, jobs, and schools.
The celebration of diversity is closely related to the
ideological status of the assimilationist project. A number of
critics, like Peter Salins and John Miller, perceive that many
Americans and newcomers alike have rejected that ideal, at least
in its melting pot version. It is difficult to parse this claim, which
raises many controversial, often unresolvable issues of fact, value,
methodology, interpretation, and causality. At this point, my
purpose is only to note some of the reasons why diversity has
become a leading social goal, not to assess its complex relationship
with assimilation. I have analyzed the latter question in some
detail elsewhere,31 so I need only sketch the general contours of
the debate here.
First, of course, there are threshold definitional questions of
what assimilation means and whether this meaning has changed
since "the good old days" (whenever they were). In fact,
assimilation has always meant a variety of things, as my earlier
summary of Gordon's taxonomy suggests. As an historical matter,
Anglo-conformity, melting pot amalgamation, and cultural
pluralism coexisted; indeed, they still do, although the mix varies.
(Anglo-conformity, for example, is now out of vogue.) The critics'
claim is that a contemporary and pernicious version of cultural
pluralism, often called "multiculturalism," is retarding
31 See SCHUCK, supra note 29, at ch. 14.
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assimilation, balkanizing American society and politics, and
weakening our civic culture.
Another set of questions is empirical and methodological.
How should we measure assimilation? Are immigrants in fact
assimilating more slowly or differently than in the past? The
standard criteria-intermarriage rates, English fluency,
naturalization patterns, civic participation, moral values,
noncriminal conduct, attenuation of ties to the country of origin-
are themselves not self-defining. Moreover, the evidence on
English acquisition is difficult to interpret. Some of it is self-
reported, much turns on the age at arrival and length of time in the
United States, and we know far less about English acquisition by
pre-1960s waves of immigrants. With those qualifications, the first
generation (the immigrants) seems as eager as ever to learn
English, and the second generation (their U.S.-born children)
seems to be learning it quickly and prefers it to their parents'
languages. Finally, generalizations about assimilation rates can be
misleading, as they vary considerably from one ethnic group to
another-another reflection of diversity's significance.
However one plots the precise historical trajectory of the
assimilationist ideal in its several forms, there can be little doubt
that the cultural pluralism version, with its enthusiastic affirmation
of diversity values, enjoys far greater acceptance today than ever
before. In large part, its current standing reflects the widespread
belief among Americans that we can to some considerable extent
have it both ways-that the study, celebration, and maintenance of
diverse traditions is compatible with assimilation to core American
values. This belief has helped to legitimate what historian Thomas
Archdeacon calls an "intermediate path" in which diverse groups
affirm their distinctive cultural traditions while also integrating
into broader civic culture." Advocates of this approach reject the
traditional melting pot ideal in favor of other metaphorical visions:
a mosaic composed of permanent and visible fragments, or a
lumpy chef's salad containing diverse ingredients.
The central question is whether American society can
successfully thread the needle socially and politically. Can it fuse
these disparate identities seamlessly and effectively enough to
satisfy both the affective needs of parochial communities and the
civic needs of the larger polities in which they are embedded? The
analysis that can address this question turns primarily on the kinds
of communal identities at stake, how robust the largely informal
processes of political and social integration are, and which claims
32 THOMAS J. ARCHDEACON, BECOMING AMERICAN: AN ETHNIC HISTORY 188
(1983).
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on present and possibly future members the polities need to make.
I answer the question with a qualified "yes."
In explaining how diversity values came to be elevated in our
public discourse, it is almost impossible to exaggerate the
importance of the civil rights movement in general and the
evolution of black politics in particular. The compelling story of
the black struggle for equality has been told many times and never
fails to inspire and instruct. Black leaders, artists, and intellectuals
of every kind have explored the extraordinarily complex feelings
that Blacks have always harbored toward an American society that
for centuries enslaved, lynched, humiliated, reviled, and excluded
them, and toward the alluring but distant prospect of ever
becoming fully integrated members of it.
Given this long tradition of approach-avoidance by black
elites, it was natural for many black leaders to express frustration
with the pace of the integration project, which relied largely on
enforcement of a relatively passive nondiscrimination principle
and had not seemed to work as well for Blacks as for religious
minorities and other ethnic groups. It was also natural for them to
seek individual and group advancement instead through other,
apparently more promising, strategies. In this spirit, they sought to
develop community and political cohesiveness by appealing to
racial pride and "black power," to foster self-help and racial
identity by building exclusively black institutions, to challenge the
traditional accomodationist approaches of moderate black leaders,
and to adopt a more confrontational and ideological political style
along with a more radically redistributionist programmatic agenda
including expansive welfare rights and Affirmative Action.
Although the black nationalist movement was always a
minority fringe among blacks-a recent estimate places its
adherents at no more than fifty thousand people-its ideological
influence was far greater, extending to other minorities and to
Whites seized by the fervor of ethnic identity-building.33 This far-
reaching idealization of diversity gathered steam in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. It was generously supported-financially,
ideologically, and rhetorically-by the Ford, Rockefeller, and
other major foundations committed to fundamental social reforms.
These powerful organizations promoted diversity as an integral
element of a larger legal and political strategy using group
mobilization, impact litigation, local control, and community
action in attempts to transform schools, voting, housing, and other
33 See Alan Wolfe, Strangled by Roots, NEW REPUBLIC, May 28,2001, at 30 (reviewing
GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (2001)).
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social institutions of every kind. This approach soon spread to
smaller foundations and university-based action projects as well.34
All of this occurred at a time when Blacks were achieving
immense progress in political, economic, and social life. One can
view this conjunction of progress and ideological shift simply as a
paradoxical fact, or view it instead as an instance of rising but
disappointed expectations fueled by a new kind of identity politics
pursued by more confident, better educated activists. I incline
toward the latter view, in part because this same conjunction has
been observed in the political movements of Mexican Americans,
Native Americans, homosexuals, the disabled, the elderly, and
other groups. Indeed, the black struggle for equality-its rhetoric
of disadvantage and segregation, its assertion of group identity, its
moral urgency, its legal strategy, and its programmatic direction-
constitutes the template on which these other groups have sought
to impress their own claims. Blacks' crusade to enforce America's
ancient but still unredeemed promises has become the model for
other civil rights and human rights struggles-not only in the
United States but throughout the world.
Diversity values gained recognition at the highest
constitutional level in the 1970s. In Lau v. Nichols,35 a 1974
decision, the Court held that the civil rights laws required local
public school districts to provide special programs to enable
children with limited English proficiency to enjoy equal
educational opportunity. Lau drove a vast expansion of bilingual
education programs in the public schools for the bewildering array
of language groups that the post-1965 immigration brought to
America. In the Bakke case,36 decided in 1978, the swing opinion
of a sharply divided U.S. Supreme Court suggested that a public
university's system of race-based admission preferences might be
upheld against white applicants' claims of reverse discrimination, if
justified on the grounds of student body "diversity." This decision
figures prominently in debates over Affirmative Action, not only
in higher education but in other policy areas as well.
If the new politics of black identity in the 1960s cast the
pursuit of diversity in a more assertive, even belligerent light,
several other developments since then have made the possibility of
successfully integrating diversity with a vibrant, cohesive civic
culture seem both benign and feasible rather than menacing. First,
the immense economic growth in the United States since the 1960s
34 See, e.g., HEATHER MAC DONALD, THE BURDEN OF BAD IDEAS: How MODERN
INTELLECTUALS MISSHAPE OUR SOCIETY 13-16 (2000).
35 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
36 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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has somewhat softened the zero-sum competition over resources
that pits ethnic groups against one another. Since 1970, the U.S.
economy has absorbed more than twenty million new permanent
immigrants (not to mention a vast increase in the number of
women working outside the home). During this period, the
economy generated about fifty-five million new jobs and increased
the gross domestic product more than eightfold in current dollars,
while maintaining unemployment at merely frictional levels and
inflation generally at or below the level of productivity gains. This
astonishing progress makes diversity seem perfectly compatible
with, perhaps even a cause of, a steady rise in the standard of living
and quality of life of all Americans, including the poor.
Second, new technologies have familiarized more people than
ever before with diversity in its most attractive forms, inuring them
to its importance in American life. With occasional vigorously
protested and publicly rebuked exceptions, the mass media's
depiction of ethnic, religious, and other diverse groups, if often
flagrantly stereotypical, tends to be positive and resolutely
inoffensive. Its not-so-subtle suggestion is that despite our
superficial differences, we are all essentially alike beneath the skin,
accent, or dress. In addition, the spatially diffuse nature of mass
media means that they expose us to diverse peoples and cultures
while keeping them at a safe distance. Viewing them in our dens
or theatres, we are able to have diversity on the cheap and without
risk. We can enjoy a kind of disembodied exoticism without
actually having to live cheek by jowl with people whose different
ways of believing and behaving make them distinctive and truly
worth understanding but whose differences also create challenges
for social integration, legal equality, and political unity.
Third, sociologists have recently shown how corporate
managers and their consultants in the late 1980s, drawing on
earlier organizational theories, developed a "diversity rhetoric"
that views racial, ethnic, and many other diversities-including
some that civil rights law does not mention-as a valuable, indeed
profitable, business resource. This rhetoric holds that a diverse
workforce facilitates the identification and solution of problems in
all areas of the organization's activity and also helps it to succeed
in a "new economy" of globalization, greater competition,
creativity, internal flexibility, and multicultural competence. At a
time when business enjoys unprecedented social prestige and
rewards, the tendency of corporate leaders to exalt and extend the
scope, meaning, and value of diversity and to exhort their
employees to implement it is bound to affect its idealization.
Finally, as Nathan Glazer has explained, a rising interest in
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intercultural education during the 1960s moved the field from its
traditional emphasis on toleration of cultural differences to a new
celebration of them.37
For all these reasons, then, the abstract ideal of diversity,
almost always either ignored or opposed throughout world history,
has now reached an apotheosis in the United States. One sign is
linguistic; diversity's antonym, uniformity, today tends to attract
disparaging adjectives like "bland," "sterile," "boring," and
"whitebread." Another sign is the extent to which an evolving
public opinion and policy discourse favoring diversity have thrown
on the defensive even established enclaves of uniformity in
American life such as public school systems, heterosexuality, and
the English language.
Nor is diversity merely a widespread ideal among social and
educational elites; it is now an explicit public policy goal
emphatically endorsed by both major parties and opposed by none
(save Patrick Buchanan's wing of the Reform Party, which only
0.5% of the voters supported in the 2000 presidential election).
Today, it is almost unheard of for those who oppose more
immigration, more integrated residential communities, or greater
accommodation of deviant religious practices to say publicly that
their opposition proceeds from skepticism about diversity-as-ideal.
In the pantheon of unquestioned goods, diversity is right up there
with motherhood and apple pie.
Is this an exaggeration? Read both President Clinton's
celebration of diversity in his 2000 State of the Union Address and
the Republican Party's paean in its platform for the 2000
presidential election. You will be hard-pressed to identify who
authored which; the two statements are practically
indistinguishable. And who wrote the following?: "America has
never been united by blood or birth or soil. We are bound by
ideals that move us beyond our backgrounds .... Every citizen
must uphold them. And every immigrant, by embracing these
ideals, makes our country more, not less American." Not a left-
wing, open-immigration universalist, but George W. Bush, the
leader of America's conservative and, for most of the past century,
lily-white party, in his inaugural address.3 8 Elsewhere I have
argued that in the late 1990s the Republican Party at all levels of
government turned decisively and permanently in a new direction
that favors expansive, ethnically diverse immigration and greater
solicitude for non-Cuban Latinos, Asians, Blacks, and other
37 See NATHAN GLAZER, ETHNIC DILEMMAS 1964-1982 (1983).
38 See George W. Bush, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2001), reprinted in President: 'I
Ask You to Be Citizens,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2001, at 14-15.
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minorities and women who have often voted against its
candidates.3 9 Economic historian Robert Fogel's assertion that
''commitment to diversity is essential to any party that aspires to
govern,"40 is confirmed by congressional Republicans' conspicuous
failure in recent years to challenge the Affirmative Action issue,
an acquiescence reflecting deep fears about the political
consequences of being depicted as racist or antiminority.
At the close of the twentieth century, American politics in
effect installed a diversity ratchet; there is now no turning back.
II. DIVERSITY AS A CONTEMPORARY VALUE
We have seen that the ideal of diversity-as-ideal, diversity as
an affirmative goal of civil society and of government, has gained
broad acceptance in America only very recently and only after a
very long struggle with the forces favoring ethnic homogeneity,
forces that have prevailed in virtually all other societies at all other
times. The intriguing and compelling question remains-why?
I have already discussed some historical and sociopolitical
causes: the demographic embeddedness of diversity; the
promptings of national guilt; the nature of immigration politics;
unprecedented challenges to the earlier assimilationist ideal; the
evolution of the civil rights movement; the appropriation of this
movement by other claimant groups; the softening of traditional
resistance through steady economic growth and technological
change. But we still cannot fully answer the "why?" question
without also considering the interests and values that Americans of
varying ideological positions think diversity serves and dis-serves.
Identifying these effects, of course, cannot conclusively answer the
question; after all, Americans may misapprehend those effects or
embrace diversity for other, nonconsequentialist reasons.
Nevertheless, knowing which interests and values diversity
implicates probably brings us as close as we can get to
understanding why we pursue it as avidly as we now do.
I am unaware of any systematic effort to analyze diversity in
these terms. Nevertheless, many of the positive values that
diversity enthusiasts claim for it closely resemble, mutatis
mutandis, certain values that some familiar political and social
theories advance. And although large gaps always exist between a
society's avowed, abstract ideals and its actual behavior, we should
still expect a strong correspondence between the values that we
affirm and proclaim and the advantageous consequences that we
39 See SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 147.
40 FOGEL, supra note 30, at 36.
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think society would reap from their pursuit and realization.
Let us consider, then, how one would understand and assess
diversity-as-ideal-both positively and negatively-under four
different political-social theories: liberal, communitarian,
utilitarian, and what I shall call functionalist. I begin with some
disclaimers. First, as will soon be apparent, I discuss each of these
theories in a most schematic and summary fashion. Such a sketchy
treatment is justified, I think, by the very limited purpose for
which I wish to use them-to reveal how thoughtful people
holding different normative commitments might regard and
evaluate diversity. For this purpose, I need not explicate the
theories systematically or at length but shall merely discuss them
insofar as they bear on diversity values.
Second, I do not mean to suggest that most Americans in fact
think, much less theorize, in this way, or that these are the only
theories that one might plausibly defend, or that they are
internally coherent or empirically sound. Other ideological
categories (Hollinger's, for example) also speak to diversity issues,
sometimes more directly than the theories I discuss. Instead, I
simply assume that taken together these theories are likely to
capture all of the diversity values, positive and negative, to which
the vast majority of Americans subscribe. It is for this reason that
I discuss utilitarianism separately and very briefly, even though it
is more a theory about how to define social welfare than a
comprehensive social-political theory.
Finally, I do not discuss theories in which diversity creates
value to the groups themselves, as distinguished from value to the
individuals who comprise them or to the community in which they
exist. I know of no good theory of this kind that reflects American
political culture. Pluralism, for example, values groups not for
themselves but for how they affect individuals and the larger social
system. The point is not that groups have no interest in diversity
values-indeed, their character, integrity, and perhaps even their
survival vitally depend on how individuals and society think about
diversity-but that diversity is ultimately valorized by individual or
communal assessments.
Liberalism. The relationship between liberalism and diversity
is subtle and, as we shall see, multidimensional. Although many
versions of liberal theory have been advanced, their common
theme is the paramount value of individual freedom and
autonomy. Some of these competing versions of liberalism differ
concerning the nature of individuals, the conditions that are
essential to or tend to foster this freedom, the nature, limits, and
moral status of self-interest and competing human motivations, the
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relationship between individual and group rights, the role of
government in defining and securing these rights, and many other
questions. They converge, however, on a commitment to the
flourishing of individuals, the free and independent exercise of
their wills, and the securing of their rights. In this sense, at least,
libertarianism is simply a subset of liberalism; libertarians'
approach to diversity does not differ significantly from that of
more garden-variety liberals.
Liberalism does not really regard diversity as an independent
or ultimate value. Rather, it views diversity as a possible, or even
probable, consequence of different individuals' exercise of their
wills and rights. The reason is plain. Each individual possesses a
distinctive genotypic endowment and a unique psychology. These
are shaped in part by different geophysical and historical forces
and by social institutions and ideologies that lend structure to, and
reciprocally affect, their particular interests. Individuals who
exercise their free wills in pursuit of their perceived interests are
bound to make diverse choices and commitments, achieving
greater or lesser success as they pursue their ends.
These choices, according to liberal theory, constitute the
authentic expressions of individuals' freedom and autonomy. To
that extent, these choices also constitute their social identities and
their ways of life. Liberalism's respect for this freedom and
autonomy implies a respect for this identity and the choices that
constitute it. Liberal theorists disagree, of course, about the social,
political, economic, and psychological conditions that must in fact
obtain before one can properly ascribe to individuals the genuine
freedom of will that alone can legitimate their choices. They also
disagree about the state's role in establishing, altering, and
interfering with these conditions. But the diversity that flows from
these exercises of individual freedom is presumptively valid,
although the strength of the presumption and the circumstances
under which it may be overridden depend on the particular liberal
theory.
Liberalism, then, finds diversity not only congenial but in a
sense definitional or constitutive. For this reason, liberalism
accords a special, even privileged role to markets. Markets, in the
liberal view, are highly effective mechanisms for giving effect to
individuals' diverse choices and assuring that buyers and sellers
will only trade when both of them believe that they will advance
their own interests by doing so. Moreover, it is precisely the
diversity of individuals' interests and preferences that makes
trades possible and mutually advantageous. The more diversity
there is, the more beneficial are the trades that markets can
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effectuate.
Markets affect diversity in other complex and interesting
ways-and vice-versa. The existence and pursuit of comparative
advantage and scale economies among producers lead to
specialization of functions, which in turn engenders the further
diversification of skills, products, interests, and preferences. This
specialization of functions, like the market itself, underscores the
importance of the interdependencies among market participants,
the self-interested value of cooperating with others, and the
benefit of attending to their interests as well as one's own. In this
often-ignored sense, the market is-as Adam Smith maintained-a
profoundly civilizing, socializing, and pacifying process. This is so
even as it wreaks creative destruction (in Joseph Schumpeter's
famous phrase) with remorseless efficiency. In this important
sense, the market makes the toleration of differences an economic
virtue-and not just a civic one-and it reserves its greatest
rewards for those who are skillful at anticipating and promoting
differences for which people are willing to pay.
Under certain conditions, however, diversity can impose
significant costs and impair the market efficiency that liberalism
prizes. Where interconnectivity and network externalities are
significant (i.e., where an activity's value to individual participants
increases geometrically as the number of participants increase, as
with a telephone or computer network), market competition
among different service or connectivity standards may be less
efficient than having the state mandate uniform standards.
Adverse selection in insurance is another diversity-related
impediment to market efficiency. Where the participants in an
insurance pool are diverse in ways that pose significantly different
risks of loss, but their premiums are based, for one reason or
another, on average risk rather than on their own risk, those whose
risks are lower than average will have an incentive to avoid or
abandon this pool in favor of other coverage for which they will
pay a lower premium reflecting their own, lower risk. This will
leave only relatively high-risk people in the insurance pool, people
whose high-cost coverage will often be unaffordable to them and
who therefore must either be publicly subsidized or go without
insurance. Even liberal polities, which generally privilege market
allocations over state-mandated equality, may find both of these
outcomes politically unacceptable.
In the liberal conception, diversity is much more than just the
result that flows from free individual choices in a market economy.
Diversity also affects how individuals perceive the world, including
what they regard as natural and what they think is possible. For
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this reason, diversity helps shape our preferences as well as reflect
them. People who have grown up in a homogeneous social,
physical, or cultural environment form their assumptions about
what is normal on the basis of their experience of sameness, which
they take to be normal, even natural. Japanese people who have
never seen Scandinavians are more likely to think of black as the
natural hair color. Fundamentalist Muslims who have never seen
women venture outside the home except in the company of a male
family member are likely to think of females in the labor force not
simply as irreligious but as unnatural. Those who have lived their
lives in an isolated rural village are more likely to doubt the
possibility of high-rise apartment living or air travel. The
penetration of television into each of these settings has
transformed these assumptions, of course, but that is precisely the
point. Experiencing diversity causes us to think differently-and
sometimes to desire different things. In this sense, one may see
diversity as a precondition for the genuine exercise of the fully
informed, de-"naturalized" freedom that is liberalism's principal
goal.
Diversity's enlargement of freedom in this sense, however,
will affect individuals in different ways. At one extreme, diversity
can arouse awe and wonder about the sheer profuseness,
complexity, and ineffability of life, implicating spiritual values and
engendering the kind of world-love of which poets like Walt
Whitman, who are particularly attuned to diversity, have always
sung. To observe people of different cultures, beliefs, and
conditions going about the prosaic business of living is, I think, to
gain greater respect for the resourcefulness, vitality, adaptability,
resilience, humor, and courage of the species. A liberal society
whose raison d'etre is the pursuit of individual self-realization and
material well-being has a special need to cultivate this kind of
world-love and mutual respect, and diversity is among the most
valuable resources for doing so.
There is a much darker side to this diversity-inspired freedom,
however, one that threatens the liberal project. The encounter
with diversity is one of the most far-reaching elements of the larger
process of modernization. In traditional, ethnically sequestered
societies, as well as in traditional enclaves of already modernized
ones, this encounter is profoundly jarring and disorienting.
Instead of arousing humanitarian feelings, this encounter may
excite the very opposite-fear, repugnance, and intolerance-and
impel a retreat to the comforts of familiarity, sameness, and a kind
of primordial solidarity with those whom one defines as one's own.
At the extreme, this tribalism (as it has aptly been called)
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cultivates a smouldering hatred of the other that, with little
warning or pretext, can explode into a communal conflagration
and even genocidal violence against newcomers, foreigners, or
others deemed to be outside the tribe-even those who have been
neighbors for centuries. The recent and in some cases continuing
bloodlettings in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Northern
Ireland, and other killing fields confirm these dread dangers.
Even in more civil societies that are fully accustomed to and
comfortable with diversity, however, it often sows conflict and
discord, which in turn impose significant social costs and impede
the attainment of individual goals that liberalism promotes.
Within any particular group-whether public or private, profit or
nonprofit-the existence of conflicting perspectives and interests,
mobilized by opportunities for strategic behavior, magnifies the
costs of internal governance, decision making, and collective
action; in the extreme, this can produce organizational paralysis or
failure. At a political or societal level, diverse interests typically
organize into groups that seek to benefit themselves and their
members by competing with other groups for resources, status, and
various forms of power. This competition benefits society in many
important ways. For example, it can limit undue concentrations of
political and economic power, increase accountability by elites,
enhance the public's participation in decisions that affect them,
encourage innovation, educate public officials about the
consequences of their actions, and the like.
This same diversity-driven competition, however, can also be
socially damaging. The need for collective action to achieve social
and individual goals is a perennial concern in a liberal society,
where free riding and other forms of opportunistic behavior by
individuals and groups are endemic because of the limits on state
power. Sometimes only a sense of common purpose and
commitment can overcome these obstacles and support the social
undertakings and public goods that are essential to communal
well-being. Recent social science has developed the notions of
social and cultural capital and trust to describe the qualities of civic
life that are required to forge and sustain these bonds. Yet a
diversity that is too widespread, too divisive, and runs too deeply
can dissolve these bonds-or even prevent them from forming in
the first place. We can see the enormous price that diversity exacts
in the disunity that threatens Canada, Russia, Sri Lanka, and a
host of other vulnerable states. I hasten to add that the problem is
not diversity per se, but the society's failure to tolerate or integrate
diversity. This distinction is both true and highly relevant to long-
term communal stability. Unfortunately, however, too many
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societies view it as largely academic in the short run-rather like
reproaching Bangladeshis because the destructiveness of their
weather is due to their poorly constructed houses, not the
monsoons.
Diversity also raises a host of practical and legal problems for
societies committed to the liberal principle of equal treatment,
dignity, and respect. In order to apply this fundamental principle,
we must first decide which groups are similar enough that they
must be treated the same, and which are sufficiently different that
they fall plausibly into different categories, justifying disparate
treatment. Is a conscientious objector who is an atheist sufficiently
similar to a member of a religious group like the Quakers that he,
like them, should be draft exempt, or does the nonreligious basis
for his opposition to war make him more like individuals who have
"merely" political objections to war? Are the Boy Scouts
sufficiently similar to the Rotary Club to be under the same duty
to accept members it wishes to exclude, or are the Scouts more like
a religious group whose power to exclude is essential to its very
meaning? These kinds of questions arise constantly in a diverse,
organizationally complex society like the United States, yet it is
precisely this diversity and complexity that make these questions
so difficult to answer in a coherent, principled, and convincing
fashion. The more variables that are arguably relevant to the
identity of an individual or group, the more indeterminate and
controversial the judgment about how to classify and treat it will
be. And the more indeterminate and controversial this judgment,
the more likely it is that people will view it as discriminatory and
unfair, a perception that in a diverse, liberal society is particularly
corrosive to faith in the rule of equality under law.
Consider the phenomenon of liberal citizenship in an era of
massive migration-legal and illegal, work-, family-, humanitarian-
and colonialism-related-by individuals from many different
cultures. On which grounds can a liberal state properly refuse to
admit strangers? Is it ground enough that the state concludes
through democratic processes that some groups are less likely than
others to assimilate to the dominant culture? Once migrants are
on the state's territory, can the state discriminate against them in
its allocation of resources and status? Is it obliged to offer them
full membership, and, if so, what does full membership include?
Which preconditions for citizenship can the state fairly require the
migrant to meet? What level of cultural assimilation can it require
and what are the indicia of this assimilation?
In a liberal polity, each of these issues (and a host of others)
becomes more problematic because of three tenets of modern
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liberalism's "voluntarist conception of freedom" (in Michael
Sandel's critical phrase).41 First, state power to coerce individuals
should be limited except when and if collective action to
implement collective norms can be specially justified. Second, the
scope of market and other consensual institutions should be
correspondingly maximized. Third, the state should maintain a
scrupulous neutrality as among different conceptions of the good
out of respect for individuals' freedom and autonomy to choose
their own ends. When migrants are culturally and
demographically diverse as among themselves and are also highly
differentiated from the native population in important respects,
these difficulties are further exacerbated by political ones; natives
more easily think of the newcomers (especially if they are
undocumented) not as members of the same community but as
unassimilable and undeserving "others."
In such societies, minority demands for special religious,
linguistic, and other cultural rights, not to mention claims for
political autonomy, inevitably arise. A threshold question is
whether Affirmative Action and multicultural claims are best
understood as liberal claims on behalf of individuals who seek to
exercise their freedom as autonomous individuals, or instead as
group claims that are not really intelligible within an account of
value rooted in liberal individualism.
I take the former, liberal view, at least insofar as a democratic
society like the United States is concerned. The undeniable
importance of group life in all societies, including liberal ones,42
does not imply the existence of group interests not ultimately
reducible, as a normative matter, to the interests of individuals. It
is true that individuals and their identities are constituted in large
part by their group affinities, and that a liberal legal system that
protects individuals' freedom must enable them to associate with
others to pursue commonly defined ends. It is also true that even
a liberal system of law and politics must treat individuals as group
members for certain purposes (e.g., preventing discrimination on
the basis of imputed group membership; administering a state that
often uses group categories for instrumental reasons), and that
such a system may confer on organizations certain rights, such as
limited liability, standing to represent members, perpetual
41 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 278 (1996).
42 Perhaps especially liberal ones. The most individualistic and market-friendly
societies, like the United States, may be ones in which people most intensively crave and
must fashion for themselves the affective and solidaristic ties to others that individualism
inhibits and that people in a more communitarian society simply inherit and take for
granted.
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existence, and even self-government. These group interests and
rights, however, all claim their justification in terms of the interests
and rights of their individual members. 43  Even hierarchical
organizations like the Catholic Church almost always have some
norm (individual salvation through the Church) or mechanism
(confession) meant to assure fidelity to their members' interests.
And even the most ardent defenders of multicultural rights in
modern democratic polities, philosophers like Will Kymlicka,
ultimately ground them in the welfare of individual group
members, not the groups themselves."
There may be a persuasive social theory that values groups
qua groups quite apart from their value to individuals. Insofar as
American society is concerned, however, I do not know what it
would be. To be sure, certain traditional societies do not really
conceive of individuals apart from the groups to which they
belong, much less value their interests in opposition to those of the
groups. New Zealand's Maoris are an example. But such
traditions have little to teach us about managing diversity in
twenty-first century America. Accordingly, we need not develop a
separate group-qua-group model to account for the diversity
values that Americans find in the group that they inhabit or avidly
join. Liberalism adequately captures those values.
Communitarianism. Liberalism, of course, has had no dearth
of critics. Liberalism's critics may differ over many things, but
almost all of them-whether they call themselves civic republicans,
cultural conservatives, fundamentalists, communitarians, socialists,
communists, nationalists, fascists, monarchists, nativists,
syndicalists, neo-Platonists, or something else-share at least two
big things: a longing for an integrative, soul-satisfying, character-
cultivating community, and a conviction that liberalism, with its
emphasis on individuals' rights to pursue their own conceptions of
the good without collective interference, is incapable of providing
it and may even destroy it.
Where liberalism is conducive and congenial to diversity, this
communitarian vision (as I call it for want of a better label) finds
43 Several qualifications are necessary here. First, the ultimate interests in question
may be those of third-party nonmembers. The U.S. Army, for example, is justified by
serving the interests of society's members, not of individual soldiers. Second, a group
seeking to reflect the interests of its members must often use some interest-aggregation
method (e.g., majority rule) that sacrifices the interests of some members in order to
satisfy the interests of others. But it is the members' interests that count, not some distinct
interest of the collectivity. Third, none of this denies the pervasive reality that groups that
in principle are member oriented often become self-serving and even oligarchic in fact.
44 See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995) (especially
chapter 3).
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diversity at best problematic to its program of communal cohesion.
This is so even when communitarians recognize, as many do, that
diversity in today's America is both an inescapable social fact and
produces some of the benefits that liberals claim for it. After all,
at the heart of the communitarian vision are not individual
purposes but common ones. In this view, it is only through the
active and cooperative participation of its citizenry in collective life
that these common ends are discovered, legitimated, and executed.
To the communitarian, government has a far-reaching
responsibility to transform individuals into active citizens
committed to deliberation and practical reason, to help form their
character by cultivating civic virtue, and to forge communal
identities throughout society.
Diversity does not necessarily prevent government from doing
these things, but it does render each of them more difficult to
accomplish. First and most obvious, diversity tends to make the
identification and pursuit of common goals elusive, if not illusory.
This attenuation and fragmentation of common purpose, of
course, is a matter of degree. Globalization has brought diversity
to even the most communitarian societies; indeed, migration,
telecommunications, and market culture are increasing diversity
everywhere. For example, Japan-a notoriously extreme case of
ethnic, cultural, and economic homogeneity-now includes a
substantial and growing population of long-term foreign nationals
(mostly Korean) and guestworkers who are affecting the society in
ways that many Japanese believe, rightly or wrongly, are insidious.
A high level of diversity can undermine a communitarian
ethos in any society. Many Japanese fear that it is threatening
theirs, and others throughout the world blame globalization,
especially global capitalism and labor migration, for the same
reason. The American Framers obsessed about the possibility that
diversity would endanger their new regime. Assailed as the young
republic was by numerous internal and external sources of
disorder and fragmentation, it desperately needed a strong civic
integument that could bind the national polity together. James
Madison was perhaps the most astute in recognizing the threat that
diversity posed to the fragile national unity and sound governance.
In his Federalist No. 10,11 Madison famously analyzed the problem
of economic and social diversity--its multiplication of narrow
interests that might combine to subvert the broader public
interest-and he devised a novel remedy. By expanding the polity
to include a broader range of interests, he wrote, it would be
45 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
2001] 1947
HeinOnline -- 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1947 2000-2001
CARDOZO LAWREVIEW
harder for a stable and monolithic majority to form that could
oppress the rights and interests of minorities whose protection was
in the public interest. Ironically, and brilliantly, Madison's
solution to the problem of social diversity was for the state to
encompass more of it.
Madison, however, was not a thoroughgoing communitarian;
he endorsed some of its values only in compromised, quasi-liberal
form. He feared that majoritarian or populist governments, no
less than monarchical ones, might oppress important interests and
liberties, yet he saw the necessity for a vigorous central authority
to discharge certain responsibilities. In order for more diversity to
serve as the remedy for majoritarian dangers, Madison had to urge
a federal republic on a continental scale, one whose powers would
largely concern national defense, foreign affairs, regulation of
interstate commerce, and certain other areas in which federal
authority and initiative were needed to blunt the parochial
incentives of individuals and states. Diversity was an attractive
remedy, however, only insofar as its risks could be muted.
Madison hoped that deliberative, civically engaged, virtuous, and
patriotic elites at all levels-he regarded the state legislatures as
special dangers-could achieve the requisite harmony, while the
dispersal and limitation of governmental powers would tame their
dangerous propensities.
Diversity also poses other threats to the communitarian
project. Vigorous public participation in civic affairs is the very
essence of communitarian citizenship, yet diversity could
discourage it. Citizens who for cultural or other reasons do not
share the common goals and values that define the political
community are likely to feel estranged from it. They may view
politics as a futile, frustrating activity that simply compounds their
alienation and marginality. Indeed, the more solidaristic the
community, the more profound that alienation may be; being (or
being seen as) different creates psychological confusion within
oneself and conflict with the larger society. This has been the
experience, for example, of many long-resident foreigners in Japan
and even of Japanese nationals who, because of foreign parentage
or otherwise, are viewed as being different. They participate in
civic life at low levels, mirroring their lack of social integration.
Reactions of this kind are common among newcomers to any
social group who have not yet assimilated, or perhaps actively
resist, its norms. Often, they retreat from the dominant
communities from which they are alienated into smaller normative
enclaves where they can nourish their own values and live by their
own rules. This enclave strategy has been studied in many
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different kinds of social groups-for example, religious and
spiritual sects, street gangs, immigrant neighborhoods, and the
like. For all the affective and spiritual consolations of such a
strategy, it may actually hinder the group's integration into the
larger communal mainstream by accentuating and perhaps
institutionalizing what might otherwise be transient or insignificant
differences.
Certain radical forms of communitarianism, moreover,
demand a more or less resolute ideological commitment to some
monistic understanding of society, economy, polity, and history.
Classic Marxism, for example, envisioned a future in which social
divisions, largely defined by economic classes and their distinctive
interests and worldviews, would first sharpen and clash but, once
the means of production were socially controlled, would ultimately
give way to a harmonious unity of interests and worldviews. Many
European socialist movements advanced similar, if less
apocalyptic, visions. The broader genre of communitarian
utopianism has never had much use for diversity, except perhaps at
the margins where it cannot threaten social harmony and collective
authority. Indeed, the teleology of these visions was generally one
of ever increasing social harmony and unity, as in communism.
Finally, this tension between communitarianism and diversity
is even greater at the global level. The diversity of interests
among-not only within-states confounds their aspirations for a
peaceful international community governed by international law.
Indeed, even the growing integration of states into regional blocs
that have achieved some degree of harmonization among
themselves, as the European Union ("EU") has, may exacerbate
the bloc's conflicts and diversity of interests with its outside
competitors; the EU's growing tensions with the United States and
with Turkey, for example, illustrate this dynamic. In this way,
achieving regional uniformity may simply raise the inevitable
struggle between community and diversity to a higher,
supranational level.
Utilitarianism. In a utilitarian worldview, diversity is no
different than anything else. Some people love it, some hate it,
and most are somewhere in between. It confers some benefits and
imposes some costs, and the definition and incidence of these
benefits and costs usually vary from person to person, from
domain to domain, and from situation to situation. In this view, all
of the possible effects of diversity that I have already discussed, as
well as others still to be mentioned, are potentially relevant to the
individual's or group's identification and calculation of benefits
and costs.
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Utilitarianism bears an interesting relationship to liberalism.
Individual freedom, liberalism's ultimate ideal, is to the utilitarian
merely an instrumental value, facilitating the enlargement of one's
utility but not necessarily valuable in and of itself. Freedom, in the
utilitarian view, is simply one of the innumerable human
conditions to which different people will assign greater or lesser
values, depending on their own preferences. Diversity is merely
one of those conditions. A utilitarian society would produce the
amount of diversity (types, levels, and domains) that maximizes
social welfare as expressed and measured through voting, market
behavior, and other instruments of individual and collective
choice.
It is hardly coincidental, of course, that this utilitarian
conception of diversity closely resembles the notion of diversity in
the economic domain. Economic analysis begins (and ends, some
would say) with a utilitarian methodology for measuring benefits,
costs, and the efficiency of markets. The difference is that the
utilitarian society must also devise some mechanism capable of
aggregating these individual preferences into a political-policy
decision. Neither markets nor simple majority rule can accomplish
this.
Utilitarianism, then, is agnostic about diversity, viewing it as
simply one of the conditions of life that may bring people pleasure
or pain. But the more diverse a utilitarian society is, the more
difficult it will be for citizens to understand and identify with one
another and thus to make collective decisions. In this sense,
diversity poses much the same kind of political and decision-
making problems for utilitarians that it poses for liberals and
communitarians.
Functionalism. Functionalism is a theory according to which a
society (which functionalists tend to view as an organic whole)
orients its norms, practices, and institutions toward ensuring its
survival and the successful attainment of its goals, whatever they
may be. Every society, of course, is functional in this sense.
Indeed, as many critics have noted, vulgar functionalism, like
vulgar Darwinism, comes perilously close to tautology-and to a
status quo tautology at that. After all, whichever elements of a
system exist for a long time must be assumed to be functional, else
neither they nor the system of which they are a part would have
managed to survive. On the other hand, diversity is not necessarily
altogether functional for a society; much depends on that society's
particular values. As we have seen, certain kinds of diversity can,
under some common social and political conditions, threaten the
prosperity, harmony, governance, and even the survival of human
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communities.
If we focus, however, on several features that any successful
complex organism must possess in order to prosper, we can rescue
a functional view of diversity from a tautological circle that
obscures its distinctive social advantages and risks. Which are
those features? The most important, I believe, is a society's
capacity to learn and to adapt swiftly and creatively to changing
conditions. This learning capacity in turn depends upon the
society's ability to generate, aggregate, process, disseminate,
deploy, and (as necessary) correct the information it needs in
order to discover what its collective purposes are and might be,
and then to pursue them effectively.
Social learning of this kind must be a central goal of every
group, whether it be liberal, communitarian, or utilitarian.
Nevertheless, some groups are far better at it than others. I can
best make this point by considering several domains in which
diversity can facilitate this social learning process, even though it
may at the same time create certain social problems. First,
diversity is important, even essential, in strengthening the strength
and survivability of biological communities. We might usefully
understand this as the functional equivalent of social learning in
human communities, albeit in a form that processes and exploits
new information through biological processes rather than through
cognitive ones. Many people value the invigoration of the biota as
an ultimate good, as something to be valued for itself. Some may
conceive of this as part of a divine plan or manifestation, while
others who are theologically agnostic or even atheistic may believe
that humans owe a secular, moral duty of environmental
stewardship to ourselves or to future generations. Still others may
simply be awed by the sublime, ineffable beauty and power of the
living world and feel obliged not to mar it.
Diversity-driven strengthening of the biota can also be valued
as an instrumental good, one that serves a variety of fundamental
human needs: agricultural productivity, public health, medicinal
innovation, natural resource management, and others. Until quite
recently, for example, the level of biodiversity was widely thought
to be relatively unimportant to the functioning of ecosystems.
Darwin and other nineteenth-century scientists viewed the process
of speciation as functional for subpopulations seeking a biological
niche in which they could survive and reproduce in the face of
scarce resources and other hostile environmental conditions.
Little discussed was the notion that biodiversity not only benefits
the species that occupy those niches and renders the natural world
more interesting, exotic, and beautiful for human observers but
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also supports and promotes the health of the larger ecosystem.
Accumulating scientific evidence, however, now strongly
suggests that biodiversity contributes to the stability of larger
ecosystems by preventing their "collapse" or degradation into a
weakened state that is more vulnerable to temporary ecological
disturbances such as droughts or other severe meteorological
changes. In extreme cases, biodiversity may even prevent species
extinction or accelerate the recovery from the biological effects of
such extinctions. Like climate, soil type, moisture, fire, storm, and
other such factors, species diversity seems to help cushion the
damaging effect of environmental stresses. Recent, well-designed
agricultural experiments, moreover, indicate that crop
diversification can vastly increase disease resistance and yields,
much more so than standard pesticide applications on
monoculture crops.
Diversity facilitates social learning in the economic domain as
well as the biological. We have already seen how corporations
have developed a managerial "diversity rhetoric" that affirms the
problem-solving propensities of a diverse workforce and its
conduciveness to the so-called new economy. But homo
economicus finds other virtues in diversity. In approaching their
decisions to invest, produce, and consume, individuals confront at
every turn uncertainties that would be extremely costly, if not
impossible, for them to resolve on their own. The price system in a
competitive market, however, elicits, impounds, sifts, and
transmits much of the information that they need in order to make
these decisions, and it does so at a very low individual cost. Other
things being equal, the more numerous the market's participants
are and the more diverse their experiences, the better and more
valuable this information is likely to be. First, participants bring to
the market diverse local knowledge and preferences that bear on
these decisions. The price system can quickly evaluate and
aggregate this information, enabling participants to adjust their
decisions swiftly in light of it. Second, a competitive market
rewards success and punishes failure (defined by participants'
criteria); it encourages experimentation with different ways of
seeing and doing things, enabling participants to refine their
conduct and decisions in order to attract more resources. In
contrast, a monolithic or thin market, or one that is otherwise not
workably competitive, tends to weaken and distort these signals,
which induces participants to learn the wrong lessons and make
the wrong choices.
An interesting contemporary example of diversity's
informational and learning value in the economic realm is
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Europe's administration of its uniform currency, the Euro, which
was introduced amid great fanfare and optimism in January 1999.
For our purposes, the fact that the Euro plunged sharply against
other major trading currencies is less interesting than one of the
structural reasons contributing to this decline. Before 1999, when
Europe's currencies were diverse and uncoordinated, going their
separate ways (though of course influenced by one another), the
market could evaluate the different fiscal, trade, interest rate, and
other currency-related performances of each of the eleven EU
states and respond accordingly by rewarding or punishing each of
those performances. Although interstate differences in these
performance dimensions continue to exist, their melding in a
common currency means that the relationship of these differences
to the market for the Euro is much more attenuated and opaque.
That is, the individual performances are now aggregated and thus
reveal less discrete information than they did under the old system.
This makes it more difficult for the currency markets accurately to
reward and punish the performance-relevant and state-specific
economic policy decisions. This in turn reduces the markets'
confidence in both the currency and in its underlying state-specific
policy environments. Simply stated, the Euro, by suppressing
information about interstate diversity, has dulled and confused the
market signals that previously provided valuable learning and
feedback mechanisms for individual states, signals that interstate
diversity had previously thrown into sharper and clearer focus.
This suppression of diversity also encourages states with relatively
weak currencies to weaken their currencies further, with the
advantages this can bring, since their nationals will receive the
same valuation for their Euros as will nationals of strong-currency
states. Degrading market signals in these ways constitutes an
additional cost that the Euro must bear, which in turn drives down
its value against other currencies subject to more direct market
disciplines.
In the religious realm, diversity in America has fostered social
learning in numerous ways." Americans in the colonial period, the
Revolutionary era, the Founding, and indeed ever since drew vivid
and often-repeated lessons from the destructive cycles of religious
conflict and repression that raged throughout Europe during the
preceding centuries, indeed even before the Reformation. The
46 Even here, however, one should not underestimate the shaping influence of
technological and market forces. Religious people, organizations, and even doctrine have
been greatly affected-for example, the development of so-called tele-churches, mega-
churches, mass media religious advertising, and pastoral teachings on the theological
status of nuclear testing, child pornography on the internet, and rampant materialism.
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earliest American settlers, themselves refugees from the Anglican
establishment, were notoriously intolerant of other dissenters,
especially in the Massachusetts Bay colony. Nevertheless,
constant allusions to the bloody religious conflicts caused by
militant proselytizing and sectarian wars in the old countries had
discredited orthodoxies by the close of the seventeenth century,
when an astonishing profusion of religious communities enjoying
an unprecedented degree of social acceptance had established
themselves.
Religious diversity also facilitated social learning by fostering
many new and different adaptations to the extraordinary
conditions of American life. For example, countless local,
ethnically defined churches founded by immigrants during the pre-
World War I period of high immigration helped to smooth the
always rough path of assimilation. These communal enclaves
secured for immigrants the essential breathing room that they
needed in order to learn English, gain job and social skills,
consolidate their families in America, and adapt their distinctive
liturgical, linguistic, and ethnic traditions to the mores of their new
society. Although most of these religiously conditioned group
adaptations succeeded, many failed (at least in secular terms),
particularly among the more millenarian and socialistic sects.
American religious sects were perhaps the most ardent
promoters of various campaigns of social reform during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and remain so today. The
burst of evangelical energy known as the Second Great
Awakening, beginning in the early 1800s and continuing through
most of the century, sought to educate the public on a massive
scale about the need for moral regeneration, religious enthusiasm,
and social-institution building. Their many causes included
abolition of slavery, Bible literacy, temperance and prohibition,
control of prostitution and other forms of vice and crime, urban
political reform, public health, universal public education, female
suffrage and other rights of women, financial support and moral
tutelage of the indigent and wayward, missionary work here and
abroad, and many others. Different sects deployed diverse
approaches to these questions, often operating in a highly
decentralized, community-specific fashion. Indeed, disagreements
over slavery, female suffrage, and other of these issues caused
some sects to fracture, as dissident groups went their own way.
In addition to their work on specific policy issues, religious
groups have often served society as a kind of canary in the mine,
signaling hard-to-discern trouble ahead. Robert Fogel puts it this
way:
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[E]vangelical congregations have been very effective
instruments for detecting the negative effects of new
technologies and changes in economic structure on the lives of
their parishioners and for advancing programs of reform. These
congregations might be called America's original focus
groups .... Such interactions also made it possible for leaders
to formulate programmatic demands and develop strategies that
could mobilize home and far-flung congregations. It was this
process of early program formulation and the preexisting
network of organizations with passionate members and earnest
leaders that made the evangelical churches the leading edge of
populist reform movements."
Finally, religious diversity spawned a proliferation of what are
now often called "faith-based organizations" 8  that have
functioned as among the most important supports of American
family, community, national, and even international life. At least
since 1630, when a group of Congregationalist worthies established
Harvard College, these private organizations have provided many
of the social services and goods-schools, family services, health
care, museums, recreation, and many more-that in most other
advanced democracies are supplied directly or indirectly by
governments. Indeed, without this extensive and growing network
of privately provided public goods, America's tradition of limited
government could not possibly have been sustained into the
twenty-first century, when the public is demanding more of them.
Precisely because these religiously provided services are designed
to meet society's most fundamental needs, deal with its most
intimate relationships, and effectuate its most important (largely
noncommercial) transactions, they generate an enormous amount
of information about those needs, relationships, and transactions,
information that is of incalculable social value and cannot really be
obtained in any other way.
Consider, for example, the intensive national and local efforts
to improve the education of low-income children, efforts that have
greatly increased the fiscal resources devoted to public elementary
and secondary schools since the Great Society era. The reform
agenda during this period has been shaped to a remarkable extent
by knowledge gleaned from studying the strategies of private
parochial schools that seem to generate superior academic
performance and social behavior from demographically
comparable students, and to do so at a lower per-pupil cost.
Studies of the relatively successful performance of these schools,
47 FOGEL, supra note 30, at 173.
48 See generally CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT
AND FAITH-BASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENCIES (2000).
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especially in educating low-income children, have sparked
educational policy makers' recent interest in expanding principals'
managerial autonomy, enhancing teachers' job satisfaction,
involving families, motivating and disciplining students, requiring
uniforms, extending the school day, and many other educational
innovations. Much the same is true of policies directed at
rehabilitating criminals and reducing substance abuse. Here too,
the relative success of faith-based groups in these areas has drawn
the interest of many governmental and private secular
organizations seeking more effective techniques. This, then, is
social learning in a spiritual form that will be increasingly vital in
the twenty-first century.
Social learning is fueled not just by biological, economic, and
religious diversity but also by political diversity. The federal
system, for example, both enables and encourages the states and
other political subdivisions to experiment with their own
programmatic approaches to a wide variety of public issues. Louis
Brandeis's now-cliched view of the states as "little laboratories" of
social learning is probably even truer today than it was in his day.
During the 1990s, social and political developments enhanced the
states' policy autonomy and fiscal resources, while several new
lines of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Commerce
Clause and the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
began to constrain federal government authority over the states,
authority that had relentlessly expanded since the 1930s until it
had come to seem virtually limitless. At the same time, many
states have modernized their governance structures and processes
in order to increase their effectiveness in policy initiation and
implementation. These efforts have borne much fruit; state-level
policy innovations now set the agenda for national debates in a
host of policy areas. Some examples include term limits, health
care regulation, voter registration rules, antismoking efforts, gun
control, the death penalty, working conditions, environmental
standards, tax law, consumer protection, campaign finance, special
education, energy deregulation, conservation, and educational
choice.
A particularly interesting and revealing instance is Congress's
overhaul in 1996 of the welfare system, a far-reaching reform that
followed-substantively as well as chronologically-several years
in which different states experimented with different approaches,
sometimes under waivers granted by the Clinton administration to
relieve those states of federal requirements that all state programs
conform to uniform national standards. In Wisconsin and some
other states, these experiments showed promising results in
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moving welfare recipients into jobs and reducing their dependency
without generating the increased homelessness, child abuse,
abandonment, and other indicia of immiseration that most
commentators had predicted. Although powerful political
pressures would probably have ensured a far-reaching welfare
reform in any event, these experiments contributed greatly to both
the political viability and the specific programmatic content of the
1996 law.
The policy failures of states, of course, can be as influential in
shaping national policy debates as their successes. During the 2000
election campaign, the Democrats were able to cite the inability of
state programs to attract insurers into the market for prescription
drug coverage for the elderly as evidence that could be used to
discredit Republican proposals to extend that approach to the
nation as a whole. And in the aftermath of the election itself, the
failure of Florida's electoral machinery, as well as the strong
likelihood of similar failures in. other states where the popular vote
division was not as close, has spawned a political groundswell in
support of national legislation to remedy the problem.
For all of diversity's functional virtues in promoting social
learning and adaptation, diversity can also be dysfunctional.
Sanford Levinson points to many examples in the decision theory
and organizational behavior literatures indicating that diversity
can adversely affect group performance in a variety of contexts by
interfering with the ability of people to communicate, define
common goals, and pursue them effectively.49 Indeed, the chaos of
the Tower of Babel in Genesis made this now obvious point long
before social science confirmed it.
Finally, diversity may contribute to another, more ideological
kind of chaos, which may be functional or dysfunctional depending
on how the society values shocks and disruptions to its normative
equilibria. So-called critical theory seeks to create precisely this
kind of disruption-one might call it the "shock of
nonrecognition"-by insisting that diversity-talk, like other
dominant discursive patterns, is a social construct that serves both
to advance a particular political agenda or ideology and to disguise
it. In the critical view, a discourse does this by normalizing and
naturalizing itself, seeming to project a perspective on reality that
is value neutral, commonsensical, and unproblematic. Critical
theory seeks to unmask this pretentious ruse so as to reveal what is
"really" going on beneath the discursive surface.
To mention critical theory under the rubric of functionalism
49 See Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 590-91 (2000).
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might seem very odd indeed. After all, opponents of critical
theory often attack it for being cynical and nihilistic-a dog that
has fun chasing its own tail when it is not busy denying its parents,
eating its young, and covering its tracks. For all this, however, a
critical perspective on diversity remains functional. It tends to
raise important questions about diversity-talk that a smugly
integrationist society might otherwise miss. The struggle to answer
these questions can help to clarify diversity's various meanings-
including some darker ones. A critical take on diversity would
emphasize what minorities lose when they assimilate and how and
why they often resist doing so. Another would expose the
comforting but often unexamined assumptions that make different
versions of assimilation and multiculturalism seem more natural,
humane, and liberal than they truly are.
III. OUR PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY OF DIVERSITY
Given the variety of contexts in which diversity values
influence policy, and given the notorious pragmatism of
Americans' approach to most public issues, it is not at all
surprising that our public philosophy of diversity-the patterned
ways in which we think about and value it-is decidedly eclectic
rather than ideologically pure, analytically crisp, and internally
coherent. As Rogers Smith has shown, Americans have always
combined both liberal inclusionary and communitarian
exclusionary elements in our attitudes and policies toward groups
that are ethnically, religiously, and otherwise diverse. Political
leaders, he claims, combine these elements in different ways as
strategies for what he calls "people-building." The proponents of
racial and religious hierarchy have challenged at every turn
America's traditions of liberal immigration and religious
toleration. These challenges have often succeeded. Smith points
out that "chattel slavery, race-based immigration and
naturalization restrictions, ineligibility of women and the foreign-
born for the highest political offices, segregation, [and] many of
the other forms of civic hierarchy" he describes have been
pervasive indeed:
[W]hen restrictions on voting rights, naturalization, and
immigration are taken into account, it turns out that for over 80
percent of U.S. history, American laws declared most people in
the world legally ineligible to become full U.S. citizens solely
because of their race, original nationality, or gender. For at
least two-thirds of American history, the majority of the
domestic adult population was also ineligible for full citizenship
for the same reasons. Those racial, ethnic, and gender
restrictions were blatant, not latent. For these people,
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citizenship rules gave no weight to how liberal, republican, or
faithful to other American values their political beliefs might
be.5
0
Even today, when we have put the most violent and intolerant
opposition to diversities of all kinds largely behind us, Americans
exhibit a bewildering, ostensibly inconsistent mix of attitudes
toward the social and political value of diversity. For example, we
welcome (or at least tolerate) different ways of speaking, dressing,
eating, praying, working, speaking, and living-an easygoing,
shoulder-shrugging attitude toward cultural differences that seems
remarkable, and often attractive, to many first-time visitors. At
the same time, however, we increasingly hive ourselves off into
gated residential communities and other enclaves in which these
differences are muted and concealed, if not banished, by the
uniformities of economic class and lifestyle. It is as if we like the
idea of diversity so long as we need not live too close to it.
Other seemingly paradoxical attitudes toward diversity
abound. Consumers who support the world's richest smorgasbord
of goods, services, and communications channels nevertheless
patronize vendors that segment them into highly segmented
"niche" product and media markets, which in turn construct them
and their interests as narrowly and exclusively as possible. The
best-educated, most secure, and most cosmopolitan generations of
Americans search for, cling to, and project to others the most
parochial and self-isolating identities. We honor the universal
human rights that our Constitution and laws proclaim, yet we resist
recognizing those rights when they might detract even slightly
from our national sovereignty. We laud the diversity created by
small, entrepreneurial enterprises while also countenancing
consolidation and concentration in much of the economy. Our
public and private institutions adopt Affirmative Action programs
designed to increase certain kinds of diversity (e.g., skin color and
language group) while ignoring or even discouraging other
diversities that are (or ought to be) more closely related to the
goals of those institutions. Law school faculties, for example,
evidently have little enthusiasm for viewpoint diversity and even
for its closer proxies (e.g., religious tradition), yet their core
intellectual mission should be to encourage the clash of
viewpoints.
The coexistence of these different attitudes and behaviors
may confuse or even unsettle us, but this need not imply that we
are irrational or self-contradictory about diversity-though we
50 ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 15 (1997) (citation omitted).
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may be. Some of them can mesh quite easily with one another; for
example, we may prefer that one market be concentrated in order
to enjoy scale economies while wanting another to be more
fragmented. Other attitudes or practices, however, may be in
strong tension-for example, the competing claims of human
rights and national sovereignty. Still others, like Affirmative
Action policies that ignore the most valuable dimensions of
diversity, seem flatly inconsistent or even irrational.
This normative eclecticism leads to a second striking feature
of our public philosophy of diversity. Although some minimal
social commitment to diversity values seems to span all of the
domains I have discussed here, diversity seems to mean different
things and carry different valuations in each domain. It carries
different valence in economic policy, for example, than it does
with respect to immigration, Affirmative Action, and church-state
issues. Indeed, even within any single domain-biodiversity, say-
its value depends not only on how we define and regulate it (as
under the Endangered Species Act) but also on the zeitgeist that
prevails there at a given time (e.g., the state of debates among
scientists, environmentalists, and politicians).
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